Can Russians Enter Poland? Law, Statistics, and the New Reality After 2022

Can a Russian legally cross the Polish border today? The answer is neither simple nor obvious.

After 2022, Poland introduced one of the most restrictive entry systems in the EU, which does not close the doors completely, but allows only a few people through – political refugees, family members or people with the Polish Card.

How does this "filter" work? How many Russians still make it to Poland despite restrictions? And what do the statistics say? See how war, sanctions, and fear have changed the rules of the migration game.

1. Russians in Poland – between sanctions and the search for a new life

2. “Border barrier for Russians?” – who from the Russian Federation can and who cannot enter Poland

3. The European Union and visas for Russians: no more facilitations

4. How Many Russians Are There in Poland? Analysis of Statistical Data

5. Poland in Europe: how do other countries approach migration from Russia?

6. Two Perspectives: Warnings from Warsaw and Demographic Exodus from Moscow

7. The Complex Picture of Migration in the Shadow of the War in Ukraine

Russians in Poland – between sanctions and the search for a new life

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 fundamentally changed relations between Europe and the Russian Federation, and migration policy became one of the key fronts in this confrontation. The question of whether Russian citizens could enter Poland was no longer a simple procedural matter.

Today, it's a complex issue, straddling national security, international sanctions, and human rights. Contrary to popular belief, the border has not been completely closed.

Instead, Poland, in coordination with the Baltic states, created a sophisticated "filter" system that radically changed the profile of Russians entering the country.

This article takes a deep dive into this new reality. We'll demonstrate that while Poland has implemented some of the strictest entry restrictions in the European Union, legal pathways still exist.

The result of this policy is a fundamental change in the nature of migration from Russia: tourists and business travelers have been largely replaced by long-term residents, political dissidents and people with already established ties to Poland.

To fully understand this phenomenon, we will first analyze the precise legal framework regulating the entry of Russians.

Next, we will delve into the statistical data to answer the question of how many Russians are in Poland and on what basis.

Finally, we will place these findings in a broader European context and examine the powerful push factors that drive emigration from Russia itself.

"Border barrier for Russians?" – who from the Russian Federation can and who cannot enter Poland

The key moment that defined the current rules was the entry into force on September 19, 2022, of the amendment to the regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration.

This legal change, a direct response to the ongoing war, was not an isolated action. It was the result of joint agreements between the prime ministers of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, creating a cohesive front among the countries bordering Russia.

The new, stricter regulations covered all border crossings on the external EU border in Poland – land, sea and air, with the latter coming into force a week later, on 26 September, to give carriers time to adapt to the changes.

Who is subject to the entry ban?

The regulation clearly closes the border to citizens of the Russian Federation traveling for tourist, business, cultural and sports purposes.

In practice, this means the end of the possibility of free, short-term travel to Poland from outside the Schengen area.

Importantly, this prohibition applies regardless of which Schengen country issued the visa.

A Russian citizen holding a valid tourist visa issued, for example, by a German, French or Italian consulate cannot use it for the first entry into the European Union through a Polish border crossing.

This rule was introduced to prevent "visa shopping" and tighten the regional sanctions system. As the Polish government has emphasized, it is unacceptable for citizens of an aggressor state to be able to travel freely within the EU while a brutal war is raging in Ukraine.

Entry "filter": exceptions catalog

The ban, however, is not absolute. The regulation precisely defines a narrow list of exceptions, creating a "filter" that allows only certain categories of people through. This list determines who can still legally enter Poland. The exceptions include:

1. Political dissidents: Individuals deemed to be opponents of Vladimir Putin's regime.

2. Humanitarian cases: Persons whose entry is necessary for humanitarian reasons, which is assessed on a case-by-case basis by the Border Guard.

3. Residence permit holders: Russian citizens with a residence permit in Poland or another EU, EEA or Switzerland country.

4. Holders of the Pole's Card.

5. Work permit holders: People who have a valid work permit in Poland.

6. Holders of certain visas: Entry is possible for holders of visas issued for humanitarian, repatriation or "Poland Business Harbour" purposes.

7. Members of diplomatic missions and their families.

8. Drivers in international transport.

9. Family members of citizens of Poland and other EU countries.

10. Persons in transit: This includes, among others, those traveling to and from the Königsberg Oblast.

    
    

This carefully constructed list shows that the policy objective is not complete isolation, but selective migration management in conditions of security threats.

The decision by Poland and the Baltic states to introduce these restrictions was no accident. It was a conscious response to the lack of EU-wide consensus on a complete ban on issuing tourist visas to Russians.

Frontline states, facing a direct threat to their public security due to the significant influx of Russian citizens – many of whom, according to polls, supported the Kremlin’s actions – decided to act together.

This created an informal, regional visa "iron curtain" that highlighted the geopolitical dividing line within the EU.

On the one hand, there were countries with historical memories of Soviet occupation, for which security became a priority, and on the other, countries that were more guided by the principle of free movement of people with valid visas.

The European Union and visas for Russians: no more facilitations

Before Poland and the Baltic states introduced their own national restrictions, the European Union took a significant first step. On September 9, 2022, the EU Council decided to fully suspend the 2007 visa facilitation agreement with Russia.

This was a clear political signal and a fundamental change in the approach towards Russian citizens traveling to the Schengen Area.

This decision, although it did not mean the introduction of a complete ban, in practice made the visa application process significantly more difficult and expensive.

The consequences for all Russian applicants were immediate and severe:

1. Visa fee increase: The standard application fee has more than doubled, from €35 to €80.

2. Extension of processing time: Consulates have been given more time to make a decision, extending the standard waiting period from 15 to 45 days.

3. Tighter rules for multiple-entry visas: Obtaining long-term visas that allow for multiple border crossings has become much more difficult.

4. Increased scrutiny and additional documents: Applicants must expect more detailed verification and the need to present a wider range of documents justifying the purpose of travel.

However, the European Union remained open to certain categories of travellers, such as family members of EU citizens, journalists, dissidents and representatives of civil society, for whom the procedure was to remain available.

Non-recognition of documents from occupied territories

Another, often overlooked, element of the EU response is the decision not to recognize Russian travel documents issued in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine and the separatist regions of Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

This move aims to prevent Russia from using so-called passportization as a tool to legitimize its territorial gains and open the path to the EU for citizens of these regions.

The suspension of the visa facilitation agreement was in fact a compromise that reflected the deep divisions within the EU.

Countries such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia demanded much more far-reaching steps, including a complete ban on tourist visas.

On the other hand, countries such as Germany and France opposed it, arguing that channels of communication with Russian society should be kept open.

As a result, the suspension of the agreement became an intermediate solution that all Member States could agree to.

This lack of unanimity at the EU level became a direct impulse for action by the frontline states.

Since it was impossible to push through a common, tough stance, Poland and the Baltic states decided that they had to take matters into their own hands to protect their own security.

This is a perfect example of how gaps in EU policy are being filled by regional initiatives in areas of key importance to national security.

How Many Russians Are There in Poland? Analysis of Statistical Data

The legal restrictions introduced have had a direct impact on the structure and size of the Russian population in Poland. Analysis of data from recent years reveals a fascinating picture: a drastic decline in short-term travel and a simultaneous, steady increase in the number of people settling in Poland permanently.

From guests to residents: the increase in the number of residence permits

The most reliable indicator of the long-term presence of Russians in Poland is the number of valid residence permits (residence cards). Data from the Office for Foreigners shows a clear upward trend, which intensified after 2022:

• October 2021: 13,700 Russian citizens had valid residence permits.

  
  

• End of 2022: This number has increased to 15,307 .

  
  

• End of 2023: Another significant jump to 21,000 people was recorded.

  
  

This systematic increase, which stands in stark contrast to the decline in the number of visas issued, is evidence of the operation of the above-mentioned "filter".

By blocking entry to tourists, Poland is also becoming a target for those who qualify for long-term stay based on work, origin or need for protection.

In Search of Safety: Applications for International Protection

Poland has become one of the main destinations for Russians fleeing the regime and seeking asylum. Russian citizens consistently rank among the top three nationalities filing applications for international protection in Poland.

• In 2023, 1,766 Russian citizens submitted such applications , which placed them in third place after Belarusians and Ukrainians.

  
  

• This trend continued in 2024. By the end of September, 800 Russians had submitted applications , again placing them in third place among the largest groups of applicants.

  
  

However, a deeper analysis of the data reveals a phenomenon that could be called the "asylum paradox." Although many Russians apply for protection, few receive it.

Poland's policy of formally allowing the entry of "dissidents" creates the impression that opposition to the war is sufficient grounds for asylum.

However, Polish and international law requires the applicant to prove an individual, well-founded fear of persecution, and not merely a general disagreement with government policy or escape from mobilization.

As a result, although many people attempt this path, their cases often fail to meet the strict legal criteria.

This results in a huge disparity between the number of applications and positive decisions. In 2023, the recognition rate for Russians was just 18% .

In the first three quarters of 2024, out of 800 applications submitted by Russians, only 150 people received refugee status or subsidiary protection, while as many as 500 were refused.

This shows how high the legal bar is and creates a large group of people whose status in Poland remains unregulated.

Visa crunch: the most tangible effect of the new policy

Data on the number of visas issued to Russian citizens by Polish consulates are the most dramatic illustration of the policy change after 2022.

• 2020: 36,460 visas

• 2021: 31,297 visas

• 2022 (invasion year): 10,974 visas

• 2023: 4,294 visas

  
  

The drop of almost 90% compared to the pre-war years is a direct and intended result of the suspension of the issuance of tourist visas.

The few visas that are still granted go to people from strictly defined, exceptional categories, such as holders of the Polish Card, opposition activists or repatriates.

The table below synthesizes key data, illustrating divergent trends: declining visa numbers and rising numbers of residents and applicants.

Russian Citizens in Poland – Key Statistics (2021-2024)

Indicator	2021	2022	2023	2024 (partial data)
Number of valid residence cards (end of year)	13,700	15,307	21,000	n/a
Applications for international protection submitted	n/a	n/a	1,766	800 (until September)
Positive decisions (protection)	n/a	n/a	approx. 318 (18%)	150 (until September)
Negative decisions (protection)	n/a	n/a	approx. 1,448 (82%)	500 (until September)
Number of visas issued	31,297	10,974	4,294	1,821 (until X)

Poland in Europe: how do other countries approach migration from Russia?

The situation in Poland, while unique due to its geographic location and assertive policies, is part of a broader, pan-European phenomenon. Comparison with other EU countries allows for a better understanding of the scale and nature of migration from Russia.

Germany: the main destination for emigration

Germany has long been a major destination for migrants from Russia and boasts one of the largest Russian-speaking diasporas in the EU. By the end of 2020, over 235,000 Russian citizens lived in Germany, and data from 2022 indicated 1.4 million people with a "Russian migrant background."

Following the announcement of mobilization in Russia in the fall of 2022, Germany saw a sharp increase in the number of asylum applications from Russians, especially young men evading the draft.

In the first quarter of 2023 alone, 2,381 Russian citizens applied for asylum in Germany, almost as many as in all of 2022 (2,851). This shows that the "push" factors from Russia affected all of Europe, not just the countries bordering it.

Czech Republic: Shifting Towards Permanent Settlement

The Czech case is particularly interesting because it illustrates a more complex dynamic. Unlike Poland, the total number of Russian citizens with residence permits in the Czech Republic decreased slightly after the invasion, from approximately 45,700 in early 2022 to 42,500 in mid-2023.

However, within this general trend, a significant structural change has occurred: the number of temporary residence permits has decreased, while the number of permanent residence permits has increased. This dynamic suggests a process of consolidation and stabilization of the Russian community in the Czech Republic.

People with weaker ties or staying in the country temporarily (e.g. some students, short-term workers) may have left the country or not been able to obtain extensions of their permits due to the tightening of the policy.

At the same time, those who had lived in the Czech Republic for a longer period of time (at least 5 years required to obtain permanent residence) were consolidating their legal status.

This indicates the evolution of the diaspora towards a more settled and less transit-oriented community.

The table below summarizes data for selected countries, allowing us to put Polish statistics into perspective.

Estimated Population of Russian Citizens in Selected EU Countries (data for approximately 2023)

Country	Estimated number of Russian citizens	Year of data
Germany 🇩🇪	approx. 274,000	2023/2024
Czech Republic 🇨🇿	approx. 42,500	2023
Poland 🇵🇱	approx. 21,000	2023

Two perspectives: warnings from Warsaw and a demographic exodus from Moscow

The full picture of the situation requires looking at two sides: Poland's official position on travel to Russia and the deep social and demographic processes that force Russians to leave their country.

View from Warsaw: Russia Travel Warning

The breakdown in relations is mutual. Since March 2022, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has consistently and categorically advised against all travel to the Russian Federation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ announcements highlight specific threats to which Polish citizens are exposed:

• Arbitrary detentions and searches of mobile phones by Russian services.

• Lack of access to financial resources (inability to use Polish payment cards).

• People with dual Polish-Russian citizenship are at particular risk. Under Russian law, they are treated solely as Russian citizens, meaning they may be subject to military mobilization.

  
  

These warnings demonstrate a complete erosion of trust and normal consular relations, making travel to Russia a highly risky endeavor.

Exodus fueled by demographic crisis

Migration from Russia to Poland and other European countries cannot be understood without analyzing the powerful "push" factors operating within Russia itself. The country has been grappling with a deep and long-term demographic crisis for years.

The number of ethnic Russians has been steadily declining, and the war drastically accelerated this process through frontline losses, increased stress-related mortality, and, most importantly, mass emigration.

This process occurred in several stages. First, Russia's population was already on a downward spiral before 2022. Second,

The full-scale invasion, and especially the announcement of "partial mobilization" in the fall of 2022, triggered the largest wave of emigration since the fall of the USSR.

Hundreds of thousands, mostly young, educated and professionally active men, left the country to avoid being sent to the front.

This constitutes a massive brain and labor drain that will have long-term negative consequences for the Russian economy and society.

In this context, those arriving in Poland, Germany, or the Czech Republic are not simply migrants. They are part of a historic exodus, driven directly by Kremlin policy. The statistics we observe at Poland's borders are therefore not only a reflection of Polish policy but also a symptom of the Russian Federation's deep internal crisis.

The Complex Picture of Migration in the Shadow of the War in Ukraine

The answer to the question "Can Russians enter Poland?" is therefore affirmative, but subject to numerous and precise conditions. The doors that were once wide open to tourists, business travelers, and cultural visitors have been almost completely closed.

In their place, a narrow gate was created, through which only people who meet strictly defined criteria can pass – those who have an established professional or family life in Poland, have Polish roots, or are fleeing political persecution.

This policy, coordinated with the Baltic states, reflects an approach that puts national security first.

Statistical data clearly confirm that the nature of the Russian presence in Poland has fundamentally changed.

It is no longer defined by short-term guests, but by the year-on-year growing number of permanent residents, workers and asylum seekers who seek refuge in Poland from the political, social and economic situation in their homeland.

However, the legal and statistical landscape is not static.

It is a dynamic reflection of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the deep geopolitical divide between Russia and the West. As long as the conflict persists, the "filter" on the Polish border will remain in place.

At the same time, the influx of people seeking to escape Vladimir Putin's regime will likely continue, posing new challenges for Poland and Europe as a whole and shaping the continent's demographic landscape for years to come.